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PARTIES TO THIS APPEAL
The Plaintiffs and Appellants are Sidney Ewing and Cathie Ewing,
individually and on behalf of the estate of Rayn Ewing, deceased. The Utah
Department of Transportation (UDOT) and the State of Utah are the Defendants
and Appellees.
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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah had original jurisdiction pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. §78A-3-102(3)(j). Jurisdiction was transferred from the
Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78A-3102(4).

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The question before the Court is if the Utah Savings Statute, Utah Code
Ann. §78B-2-l 11, allows the re-filing of a complaint within one year of the
voluntary dismissal of a timely complaint against a governmental entity if the
time allowed to bring the complaint under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act
(Utah Code §63G-7-403) had not expired at the time the first complaint was
voluntarily dismissed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This case involves summary judgment arising out of the interpretation of
statutes. Therefore, the standard of review is substitution of judgment. Peterson
v. Sunrider Corp., 48 P.3d 918, 924 (Utah 2002).
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE BELOW
The issue was preserved below in the Plaintiffs Opposition to Motion for
Summary Judgment filed April 7, 2009. (Case No. 080925951, R 65-69). It was
also preserved in the Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition filed April 16,
2009. (Case No. 080925951, R 78-82). Finally, it was preserved in the Oral
1

Argument held before the Honorable Joseph C. Fratto held on May 29, 2009.
(Case No. 080925951, R 142).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case arises out of a tragic automobile accident. On January 21, 2007,
Rayn Ewing, the daughter of Sydney and Cathie Ewing, was operating a motor
vehicle traveling eastbound on 1-80 in Parley's Canyon (near the Lamb's Canyon
area) at approximately Mile Post 137. Rayn Ewing was traveling in the #1 inside
lane. (Case No. 090902418, R 3).
At the same time that Rayn Ewing was traveling eastbound on 1-80,
Suzanne Graser was traveling westbound on 1-80 in the same vicinity. Ms.
Graser lost control of her vehicle and crossed the open center median and entered
the eastbound lanes. The Graser vehicle collided with Rayn Ewing's vehicle. As
a result of this collision, Rayn Ewing suffered serious injuries which ultimately
resulted in her death. (Case No. 090902418, R 3).
Sydney and Cathie Ewing brought this action individually and as the
representatives of the estate of Rayn Ewing against the State of Utah and the
Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT). The allegations against the State of
Utah and UDOT were that the Defendants were negligent in failing to provide a
center median barrier and otherwise maintain a safe road. (Case No. 090902418,
Rl-10).
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RELEVANT FACTS
1. The date of the accident was January 21, 2007. (Case No. 090902418, R
3).

2. Plaintiffs gave notice to the governmental entities as required by the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act. This notice was given on December 11,
2007. At no time has any party or court challenged the validity of this
notice. (Case No. 090902418, R 2).
3. Plaintiffs filed a complaint in Summit County on June 10, 2008. At no
time has a court or party alleged that this complaint was untimely.
However, the State did allege that the complaint should have been filed in
Salt Lake County. (Case No. 080925951, R 59),
4. Responding to the State's allegation, the action in Summit County was
dismissed voluntarily on September 4, 2008. No party or court has
alleged or claimed that this dismissal was on the merits or that it was
anything other than a procedural response to information from the State
that venue was improper. (Case No. 080925951, R 59).
5. Plaintiffs filed a second complaint in Salt Lake County on February 12,
2009. (Case No. 090902418, R 1).
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6. The State calculates that under the Governmental Immunities Act,
ignoring the first complaint, Plaintiffs were required to commence suit no
later than February 9, 2009. As the second compliant was filed three days
late, the State maintains that it was barred bv the Governmental
Immunities Act. (Case No. 080925951, R 56).
UDOT filed a Motion for Summary Judgment which was opposed by the
Plaintiffs. (Case No. 080925951, R 56-57, 65-69). UDOT replied. (Case No.
080925951, R 72-75). Supplemental pleadings were filed by both parties. (Case
No. 080925951, R 78-82, R 88-90). Oral Argument was held before Judge
Joseph C. Fratto on May 29, 2009. (Case No. 080925951, R 93). Judge Fratto
granted UDOT's Motion. (Case No. 080925951, R 93). UDOT thereafter
prepared an order granting summary judgment which was served on June 15,
2009. (Case No. 080925951, R 101-103). This Appeal followed. (Case No.
080925951, R 131-132).
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
This appeal concerns the interplay between the Utah Savings Statute
(Utah Code Ann. §78B-2-l 11), relevant portions of the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act (Utah Code Ann. §63G-7-403), and the Wrongful Death Statute
(Utah Code Ann. §78B-2-304(2)). Those statutes are set out in the addendum.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Utah Savings Statute is of general application and is the de facto law
of Utah in the absence of specific legislative intent. The purpose of the
Governmental Immunity Act is to give notice to the government that a claim will
be made. That purpose was met when the Plaintiffs gave proper notice to the
State of Utah and UDOT. The requirement of Utah Code Ann. §63G-7-406 to
file suit within one year was also met by the filing of the first complaint. Once
those requirements have been met, the general application of the Savings Statute
should apply. As the Plaintiffs clearly re-filed an action which had not been
dismissed upon the merits within the time allowed by the Savings Statute, the
Court erred in dismissing the amended complaint.
ARGUMENT
I.

The State Focuses on the Wrong Statute
The State claims that the Savings Statute did not apply because the time

allowed under the Governmental Immunity Statute to file suit had not expired.
(Case No. 080925951, R 59-60, 73). The State errs in this position because the
applicable statute is the statute of limitation on wrongful death, Utah Code Ann.
§78B-2-304 which provides for a two year period. The fallacy of UDOT's
position is that it would bar any action after the expiration of the Governmental
Immunity Act with or without consideration of the Savings Statute. This is in
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contravention of the plain reading of the Savings Statute and the proper
construction of the Governmental Immunity Statute.
Plaintiff begins with an analysis of the requirements of the Immunity
statute. Under §63G-7-401, a claimant must give notice to the government
within one year of the incident. This notice is jurisdictional. In other words, if
proper notice is not given, the District Court may not hear the matter. Patterson
v. American Fork City, 2003 UT 7, 67. P.3d 466. In this case, there is no doubt
that the jurisdiction of the District Court was properly invoked because notice
was timely given. The State has never complained of inadequacy of the Notice
of Claim. (Case No. 090902418, R 2).
On the other hand, Utah Code Ann. §63G-7-403(2)(b) requires an action
to be filed in the District Court within one year. This, however, is not
jurisdictional. There are two cases in which the Supreme Court denied summary
judgment in favor of the government as to estoppel of the government to assert
this limitation. Whitaker v. Salt Lake City Corp. 522 P.2d 1252(Utah 1974; and
Rice v. Granite School Dist, 23 Utah 2d 22, 456 P.2d 159 (Utah 1969). In any
event, the statutory requirement was complied with by the filing of a complaint
on June 10, 2008 which was well within the statutory period alleged to begin to
run on February 9, 2008. (Case No. 080925951, R 58-64). Thus, in all material
respects, Plaintiffs complied with the strict terms of the Governmental Immunity
Statute.
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Further, because §63G-7-403(2)(b) is not jurisdictional, it is not the proper
statute to trigger the effect of the Savings Statute, §78B-2-l 11. It is beyond
argument that the voluntary dismissal to correct venue issues in not a failure on
the merits. The statute thereafter provides that a new action may be commenced
within one year of the failure, if "the time limited .. .by law., for commencing the
action has expired." Since §63G-7-403 is not jurisdictional, the proper statute to
consider is §78B-2-304(2) which provides a two year statute of limitation for
wrongful death. It is also beyond dispute that the two year statute had expired at
the time that the second complaint was filed. The relevant question is if the lapse
of time between the dismissal of the complaint and the running of the wrongful
death statute of limitations is fatal to the Plaintiffs' claim to come under the
Savings Statute.
II.

The State Focuses on the Wrong Period of Time
Although there is authority setting out a requirement that the statutory

time to file an original complaint must not have expired at the time of the failure
of the complaint, Hansen v. Department of Financial Institutions, 858 P.2d 184
(Utah App. 1993), that authority appears to be misplaced when the facts of this
case are parsed with respect to the actual words of the statute. Since the two year
statute of limitations for wrongful death ran no later than January 22, 2009, the
second complaint filed February 12, 2009 was clearly outside the statute of
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limitations and within a one year period from the date of dismissal. (Case No.
080925951, R 65-69). The statute provides:
If any action is commenced within due time...or if the plaintiff fails
in such action or cause of action otherwise than upon the merits, and the
time limited either by law or contract shall have expired, the
plaintiff.. .may commence a new action within one year after the reversal
or failure.
Utah Code Ann. §78B-2-l 11
It is clear that the original action was commenced within due time. It is
also clear that the cause of action failed not upon the merits. (Case No.
080925951, R 59). The question is whether or not the language "time limited by
law shall have expired" refers to the time of the dismissal or the time of 1he filing
of the second complaint.
The language "time limited by law" should refer to the time the second
complaint is filed. It makes no sense to look to the time of the dismissal. This
view leads to absurd results. If, for example, the dismissal came on the day the
statute ran, the plaintiff would not be entitled to rely upon either the original
complaint or the Savings Statute. If, on the other hand, the language refers to the
time of the second complaint, the plaintiff whose complaint was dismissed not
upon the merits, get the benefit of not only the original statute of limitations, but
the Savings Statute as well.
The statutory interpretation should follow the legislative intent. There is
absolutely nothing in the Savings Statute that compels a reading that contradicts
8

the intent of extending the time to file a second complaint when the first has been
dismissed for reasons other than the merits. As pointed out below, the Savings
Statute is one of general application and there is nothing in either the Savings
Statute or the Wrongful Death Statute of limitations which would indicate that
the legislature wished to limit a second cause of action to instances in which the
two year statute had already run at the time of dismissal.

Plaintiffs would read the Savings Statute as follows. The original action
was filed within the two year statute of limitations. It was dismissed because of a
dispute as to venue. The statute of limitations for wrongful death ran prior to the
filing of the second complaint. The time had therefore expired. These facts
being undisputed, Plaintiffs' second complaint should have been accepted.

III.

Utah Case Law Supports Broad Reading of the Savings Statute

The Supreme Court discussed the purpose of the Savings Statute in
Standard Fed. Sav. & Loan v. Kirkbride, 821 P.2d 1136 (Utah 1991).

In the absence of such a plain expression of intent, we have
generally read statutes that impose preconditions to filing suit as
establishing only procedural hurdles to suit, hurdles that can be
cleared rather than absolute bars to suit. For example in {Yates v.
Vernal Family Health Center, 617 P.2d 352 (Utah 1980)) we
permitted a plaintiff to proceed under section 78-12-40 when the
initial action had been dismissed for failure to serve a "notice of
intent to commence action" under the Utah Medical Malpractice
Act, section 78-14-8. We conclude that section 57-1-32 [Utah Code
Ann. §78B-2-l 11] (the Savings Statute) does not permanently bar
further proceedings anytime some procedural failing results in the
dismissal of a properly filed complaint. (Italics Added)
9

The Kirkbride language should apply with equal force to the present case.
The order of the District Court bars further proceedings after a procedural failing
resulted in the dismissal of a properly filed complaint. This language alone is
sufficient to reverse the finding of the District Court.
IV.

The Purpose of the Previous Filing was to Give Notice of the Claim

and Notice was Given
This Court has considered the purpose of notice to the Defendant provided
by the initial filing. In C.P. v. Utah Office of Crime Victim's Reparations, 966
P.2d 1226 (Utah App. 1998), the Court was faced with a situation in which the
plaintiff filed a timely appeal from an administrative ruling, but did not serve the
complaint. After dismissal for failure to serve, but within the Savings Statute, a
second complaint was filed, this Court said:
When C.P. filed her initial petition, Crime Victims was
placed on notice that she intended to pursue her claim and thus
received all the benefit the thirty-day limit conferred on them.
966P.2d 1226.
This is in accord with the Supreme Court case of Standard Fed. Sav &
Loan v. Kirkbride, 821 P.2d 1136 (Utah 1991) which concerned the Savings
Statute in the context of a deficiency judgment. The Supreme Court held that the
primary purpose of the statute of limitations was satisfied when the foreclosing
party provides notice to the debtor that a deficiency will be sought by filing the
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action.

Even if the State were correct in saying that the appropriate statute is

the Governmental Immunity Act, this Court has consistently said that the purpose
of the notice of claim is to inform the government of the nature of the claim.
Cedar Professional Plaza v. Cedar City Corp., 2006 UT App 36, 131 P.3d 275.
To refuse to apply the Savings Statute to this case is a violation of the
consistent learning of the Courts. In this case, there was a proper notice and a
properly filed complaint. The dismissal was not on the merits. The government
had the advantage of notice of the death of Plaintiffs' daughter. The government
also knew that the Plaintiffs intended to pursue the case. The rule that the State
pursues is one of trickery and not substantive justice. The Savings Statute was
intended to preserve legitimate causes of action which are dismissed other than
on the merits.
CONCLUSION
The Savings Statute can easily be read to preserve causes dismissed not on
the merits where time remains under the appropriate statute of limitations. The
authority holding that the statute must have run at the time of dismissal is
conclusory. Plaintiffs therefore urge the Court to read the language in light of
the demonstrative purposes of the statute. Such a reading protects both parties
because the Plaintiffs have the benefit of the legislative statute while the
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Defendants are protected by the fact that it has received notice of the claim and
the intent of Plaintiffs to pursue it. This result is logical and just.
RELIEF SOUGHT
Plaintiffs seek to have the District Court's Summary Judgment reversed
and the District Court instructed to set the matter for trial.
DATED this

r

day of October, 2009.
PARKER & McCONKIE

Kenneth D. Lougee
Attorney for Plaintiffs
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Appendix 1
Utah Code Ann. §78B-2-l 11

UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE

Home | Site Map | Calendar j Code/Constitution j House I Seriate | Search

Title/Chapter/Section:

[ bo 10 [

Utah Code
Title 78B Judicial Code
Chapter 2 Statutes of Limitations
Section 111 Failure of action — Right to commence new action.

78B-2-111. Failure of action — Right to commence new action.
(1) If any action is timely filed and the judgment for the plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in
the action or upon a cause of action otherwise than upon the merits, and the time limited either by law or
contract for commencing the action has expired, the plaintiff, or if he dies and the cause of action
survives, his representatives, may commence a new action within one year after the reversal or failure.
(2) On and after December 31, 2007, a new action may be commenced under this section only once.
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session
Download Code Section Zipped WordPerfect 78B02jmi00.ZIP 1,806 Bytes
« Previous Section (78B-2-312)
Questio_ns/Cpmments | UtahjState Home Page | Terms of Use/Privacy Policy
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Appendix 2
Utah Code Ann. §63G-7-403

UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE

Home | Site Map | Calendar | Code/Constitution | House | Senate | Search

Title/Chapter/Section:

IffiilPJ

Utah Code
Title 63G General Government
Chapter 7 Governmental Immunity Act of Utah
Section 403 Notice of claim — Approval or denial by governmental entity or insurance carrier within 60
days — Remedies for denial of claim.

63G-7-403. Notice of claim — Approval or denial by governmental entity or insurance carrier
within 60 days — Remedies for denial of claim.
(1) (a) Within 60 days of the filing of a notice of claim, the governmental entity or its insurance
carrier shall inform the claimant in writing that the claim has either been approved or denied.
(b) A claim is considered to be denied if, at the end of the 60-day period, the governmental entity or
its insurance carrier has failed to approve or deny the claim.
(2) (a) If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute an action in the district court against the
governmental entity or an employee of the entity.
(b) The claimant shall begin the action within one year after denial of the claim or within one year
after the denial period specified in this chapter has expired, regardless of whether or not the function
giving rise to the claim is characterized as governmental.
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 382, 2008 General Session
Download Code Section Zipped WordPerfect 63G07J)40300.ZIP 1,979 Bytes
<< Previous Section (6_3GT7_-402)

Next Section (63G77z5Ql)_>>

Questions/Comments | Utah State Home Page | Terms of Use/Privacy Policy
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Appendix 3
Utah Code Ann. §78B-2-304(2)

UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE

Home | Site Map | Calendar | Code/Constitution | House | Senate | Search

Title/Chapter/Sectlon:

Utah Code
Title 78B Judicial Code
Chapter 2 Statutes of Limitations
Section 304 Within two years.

78B-2-304. Within two years.
An action may be brought within two years:
(1) against a marshal, sheriff, constable, or other officer for liability incurred during the performance
of the officer's official duties or by the omission of an official duty, including the nonpayment of money
collected upon an execution;
(2) for recovery of damages for a death caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another;
(3) in causes of action against the state and its employees, for injury to the personal rights of another
if not otherwise provided by state or federal law; or
(4) in causes of action against a political subdivision of the state and its employees, for injury to the
personal rights of another arising after May 1, 2000, if not otherwise provided by state or federal law.
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session
Download Code Section Zipped WordPerfect 78B02_030400.ZIP 1,918 Bytes
« Previous Section (78B-2-312)
Questions/Comments | Utah State Home Page | Terms of Use/Privacy Policy
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Appendix 4
Order Granting UDOT'S Motion for
Summary Judgment against the
Ewing Plaintiffs

F
2009

REED STRINGHAM (4679)
Assistant Utah Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
Utah Attorney General
Attorneys for Defendant UDOT
PO Box 140856
160 East 300 South, 6 t h Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah
Telephone: (801) 366-0100
rstringham@utah. gov
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
TIMOTHY PAGET, et al,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

ORDER GRANTING UDOT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AGAINST THE
EWING PLAINTIFFS

STATE OF UTAH, UTAH DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION and JOHN DOES
1 through 10,
Case No. 080925951
Defendants.
Judge Joseph C. Fratto, Jr.
SIDNEY EWING, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

STATE OF UTAH, UTAH DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION, and DOES 1-10,
Defendants.
Defendant State of Utah, Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT") moved for
summary judgment against plaintiffs Sidney Ewing, Cathie Ewing and the Estate of Rayn Ewing
("the Ewmg plaintiffs"). The parties filed supporting and opposing memoranda and the Court
heard argument on the motion. The Court granted the motion for the reasons stated in its May
29, 2009 bench opinion.

It is ordered:
1. UDOT's Motion for Summary Judgment Against the Ewing Plaintiffs is granted.
2. The action filed by plaintiffs Sidney Ewing, Cathie Ewing and the Estate of Rayn
Ewing against defendant State of Utah, Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT) is dismissed
with prejudice and on the merits.
3. This order is certified as a final judgment pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). There is
no factual overlap between the certified and remaining claims because the certified claims are
dismissed based on the Ewing plaintiffs' failure timely to commence their separate, but now
consolidated, action against UDOT. There is no just reason to delay entry of a final order
because UDOT's final legal status in the Ewing action need^aot-rem^in indefinite while the
Paget action is litigated.
DATED this J_

Approved as to Form:

James McConkie
Attorney for the Ewing Plaintiffs

1

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the June 1, 2009 a copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING
UDOT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST THE EWING PLAINTIFFS
was served on James McConkie and Bradley Parker, 5664 South Green St., Salt Lake City, UT
84123.
I hereby certify that on June 15, 2009, a copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING
UDOT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST THE EWING PLAINTIFFS
was served on the following in the manner indicated:
By United States mail, first class, postage prepaid:
David Biggs
Rachel Sykes
Attorneys for the Paget Plaintiffs
5664 S. Green Street
Murray, UT 84123
By hand delivery:
Barry Lawrence
Attorney for UDOT as to the Paget Plaintiffs
160 East 300 South 6th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0856
Dated this IfTdav of June, 2009.

REED STRINGHAM
Assistant Utah Attorney General
Attorney for Defendant L5DOT as to
the Ewing Plaintiffs

Appendix 5
Transcript of Hearing on Motion for
Summary Judgment held
May 29, 2009

May 29, 2009

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Civil No. 080925951

TIMOTHY PAGET,
Plaintiff,

MOTION HEARING

-vUTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION,
Defendant.

Judge Joseph C. Fratto

TRANSCRIPT FROM ELECTRONIC RECORDING
May 29, 2009 * 10:00 a.m.

Reporter:

Diane W. Flanagan, RPR

CitiCourt, LLC
801.532.3441

2
May 29, 2009

A P P E A R A N C E S

FOR THE PLAINTIFFS
Bradley Parker
PARKER & MCCONKIE
5664 South Green Street
Murray, Utah 84123
Tel: 801-264-1950
Fax: 801-266-1338

FOR THE DEFENDANT:
Reed Stringham
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Tel: 801-366-0370
Fax: 801-366-0101

•oOo-

CitiCourt, LLC
801.532.3441

3
May 29, 2009

P R O C E E D I N G S

THE COURT:

We're gathered here in the

matter of Timothy Paget and others -- or it's actually
Sidney Ewing and Kathy Ewing and others versus the
State of Utah Department of Transportation.

It is the

defendant's -- the defendant's motion for summary
judgment against the Ewing plaintiffs.
We've allotted a half an hour.
minutes a side.

That's 15

You can use, within the certain

bounds of good taste and decorum here, that time as
you wi sh.
We'll begin with the defendant.
MR. STRINGHAM:

Thank you.

The Court should grant our motion for
summary judgment because the plaintiffs did not refile
their lawsuit within the one-year limitation

period.

That's the simple -- a very simple statement of our
position in the case.
Your Honor, I've prepared a sort of cheat
sheet, or handout, that I think might be helpful, if I
could approach the bench and give it to you.
THE COURT:

You may.

MR. STRINGHAM:

I've also given opposing

counsel a copy of it.
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THE COURT:

Thank you.

MR. STRINGHAM:

There are no disputed

facts

in this case, and in the handout you can see I've
given a list of the undisputed material dates.

The

statute of limitations started to run on that first
date listed there on February 9, 2008.

That is when

the notice of claim is denied.
The plaintiffs timely filed their lawsuit a
few months later on June 10th, but that was dismissed
without prejudice because it was filed in an improper
venue.
THE COURT:

Is that the reason that it was

dismissed -MR. STRINGHAM:
THE COURT:

—

MR. STRINGHAM:
THE COURT:

Yes.
that they filed in -Summit County.

-- in Summit County?

MR. STRINGHAM:

Yes.

Yeah, I -- I filed a

motion to dismiss for -- for improper venue, and the
plaintiffs said that they would stipulate to
dismissal.

And so that's how that case was dismissed.
THE COURT:

And I don't want to interrupt

you, but it does seem like they -- we've come down to
this, after I've read the briefing, and that is
whether -- that's why I want to clarify exactly why
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the -- it was voluntarily dismissed.
MR. STRINGHAM:
THE COURT:

It was.

And that's how it's phrased by

the plaintiff -- the plaintiffs here, that it was
voluntarily dismissed.

It seems to me that the issue

is if an action is filed in an incorrect venue or

not

the correct venue and the -- in response to that, that
realization I suppose, the plaintiffs have opted for
the -- they opted for the process of voluntarily
dismissing it and then refiling it.
Whether that is under 78B-2-111 a failure in
the action, what -- what is your view of that?
MR. STRINGHAM:

It seems to me, your Honor,

that the phrase failure of an action means it ends, it
can no longer go forward.

And the statute talks about

not only failure of an action but failure on a ground
other than on the merits, which is what happened in
this case.

The action was ended up in Summit County,

and then it was refiled.

It wasn't transferred.

And

so in that sense, I think it failed otherwise than on
the merits.

And so --

THE COURT:

So it is a failure, then.

MR. STRINGHAM:
merits.

It is a failure on the

And so the first -- I think that the first

requirement of that savings statute is probably met.
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It failed otherwise than on the merits, but it's the
second requirement that I'm focusing on.

In order to

get the benefit of the savings statute it has to fail
on the merit -- otherwise than on the merits within
the applicable statute of limitations period -- or,
excuse me, beyond the applicable statute of
limitations period.
And if you look at the dates here on this
handout I've given you, the -- the case was dismissed.
In other words, it failed not on the merits on
September 4, 2008, when it was dismissed without
prejudice.

So in other words, they still had five

months to file the lawsuit.
The savings statute deals with the unfair
situation in which a -- a lawsuit gets dismissed

not

on the merits but the statute of limitations has
already expired.

And in that case you can see why the

legislature would say, okay, you're going to have
another year.
But in this case, we don't have those facts.
The plaintiffs had another five months and they didn't
file.

Now, interestingly, the Pagets, who -- who were

also involved in this lawsuit did file within that
year period.

They filed in December.

So I think according to the plain
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of that statute, it simply does not apply and doesn't
help the plaintiffs at all
Setting that statute aside, then, all we
have is the one-year limitation period
THE COURT
MR

Let me ask you, though

STRINGHAM

THE COURT

Okay

If they had filed by —

the

nature of the dismissal is a failure under the -- see,
the statute uses an interesting -- fails, the action
fails

And then you get, do you not, one year from

that d i s m i s s a l 7
MR

STRINGHAM

If the failure occurs after

the original statute of limitations has expired, and
we don't have that here

The plaintiffs still had

another five months to file that lawsuit

They were

still within that original one-year period of time
THE COURT

So your position is that there

was a -- if they had filed within the -- within the
time period by -- before February the 9th of this -of this year, then they would have been fine
MR

STRINGHAM

THE COURT

Yes, yes

But their mistake is, if you

will, that they -- they dismissed the matter within
the first period of time, and thus were obligated

to

refile within the -- the one-year limitation -- or the
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o r i g i n a l -- w e ' l l c a l l i t the o r i g i n a l

one-year

limi t a t i o n period.
MR. STRINGHAM:
THE COURT:

Exactly.

But if they had waited, if they

had waited until after February the 9th, 2009, to
voluntarily dismiss it because it was -- had been
filed in the wrong venue -MR. STRINGHAM:
THE COURT:

Well --

-- then they would have been

fine?
MR. STRINGHAM:

Well, I -- I -- I don't know

that they could have waited because I filed a motion
to dismiss back in -- back in June of 2008.

And so

we -- and I filed a motion, and I got a call from
plaintiffs' counsel and he said, We'll dismiss it and
then we'll refile in Salt Lake County.

And so that

was the -- that was the stipulation that we had, and
then the judge signed the order on September 4th.
I don't think it was a matter of waiting.

So

It was we

had -- we had a motion to dismiss pending, and they
agreed to dismiss it.
I -- I think, your Honor, that you
understand our position so I won't take any more of
the Court's time unless you have any other questions.
THE COURT:

No, I think I -- you have
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clarified that.

Thank you.

MR. STRINGHAM:
THE COURT:
MR. PARKER:

Thank you.

Mr. Parker?
Thank you, your Honor.

It might be helpful just for the purposes of
better understanding the dates for me to just give a
little background on this.

This case was initially

filed by another firm, and that -- and so the question
that occurred to me as it was being argued was:

Well,

if we had agreed to dismiss it, why did we wait for
five months -- or more than five months to file the
complai nt?
And to be honest -- and this is not my case,
it's my partner, Mr. McConkie's.

This has given him

significant distress, and for that purpose he's asked
me to argue it.

But he received this case about two

weeks before it was filed and looked at it, I believe
figured we had the one-year savings statute and filed
it.

It looks like it was filed a few days after what

the State claims is the running of that statute.
And I'm not saying that that two-week
is a period.

period

We accepted that case and took

responsibility for that, and it's our

responsibility.

But the -- the time of the filing came about in that
way.
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We essentially, I believe -- and I believe
Counsel has indicated correctly, that the nub of this
hangs on that part of the statute which indicates, and
the time "by law or contract for commencing an action
has expired."

If -- if -- interestingly, if this case

had not been dismissed until after the time from the
notice had expired and had then been dismissed, we
clearly would have had another year.
And hence our argument that we made in our
supplemental brief that the reason for the notice
statute is to do just that, is to give notice so that
the government has a chance to have notice before it
actually deals with the -- the nitty-gritty of -- or
it -- as the matter is commenced.

It can think about

it before the complaint is actually filed and decide
whether to try and settle it or the like.
In this case, we had not looked

specifically

at the word failure, although that's one that, your
Honor having raised that, I'm sure we'll go back and
take a look at that.

But we have looked at the

wording -THE COURT:

I don't mean to interrupt you,

but as I understand Mr. Stringham, he sort of concedes
that point, that what happened here was a failure -your briefing sort of emphasized that it was
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voluntary
MR

PARKER

THE COURT

Right

it was voluntary

And of course the statute talks

in terms not of voluntary dismissal but of a failure
And, in fact, are not the examples -- or at least some
that I'm aware of, are not -- there's no voluntary
dismissal -- what's happened here is -- for example, a
summons was not served on time so the Court
the action as determined
MR

PARKER

dismissal on the merits

dismisses

to be a failure

And on one there was a
In the case where -- what we

claim is the dicta that says, look, it has to be
within this -- if you dismiss before that period is
run, you better file within that period because the
statute doesn't apply
dismissed on the merits

That case we believe was
And -- and so that dicta

suggests that it has to be filed in that case
But in this case, this was really just a
procedural thing where it's, oops, okay, we filed in
the wrong venue -- or initial counsel -- it would be
better to file it in the Third Judicial
we'll do that
filed

District,

That case was transferred to us and we

And the question is, had we filed two days

earlier or three days earlier, then it would have been
okay

But in this case it would not have
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Let me just respond to that with -- in the
following ways.

And the first way I would respond to

that is by asking what is the purpose of the notice
statute to the government here.

And we've cited for

your Honor in our supplemental brief the Supreme Court
case that talks about the purposes of such statutes,
and that case indicates that the purpose of those
statutes -- and I'm citing from Standard

Federal

Savings & Loan versus Kirkbride, a Utah Supreme Court
case that's cited, where the Court says that the
sensible view of -- of looking at the purpose of these
types of statutes is that the purpose is satisfied
when in this case the foreclosing party
notice.
or

provided

And it gives the governmental opportunity

--

entity an opportunity to conduct an inquiry.
And so the purpose really is a notice

purpose, and indeed the State had notice here.

And

the purpose of the statute is not to foreclose
generally the rights of a party on procedural

grounds

otherwise to commence and proceed with a cause of
acti on .
Interestingly, the construction that the
State urges upon the Court is a construction that -that almost argues against judicial efficiency.

It

says, well, if you just delay and wait until that time
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period is run, and so you spread out the litigation a
little longer, and then refile -- dismiss and refile
then you re just fine

By being a little more

expeditious and cooperative in this case

you ve --

the State claims that we've placed ourselves in a
position of jeopardy
I would like to offer even an additional
argument that I believe is helpful

And that is, in

looking at the text of the statute that's

referred

to -- and this is the savings clause statute -- the
words that we have focused on are, and the time
limit -- "time limited either by law or contract for
commencing the action has expired "
And I would like to just concentrate for a
moment on commence and what it means to commence an
action

If I file an action against a -- if I wish to

litigate against a nongovernmental entity, and it s
not a physician or there aren't -- there aren't other
notice requirements, but I -- I'm litigating

against

my neighbor for putting a fence on my property, then I
might initiate that claim by filing a complaint
do I commence the claim 7

How

I might commence the claim

by filing the complaint
The -- there's a Supreme Court case that
suggests that an action is commenced by having a
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summons served.

And so this word commence is subject

to different interpretation.

What does commence mean?

Commence means initiate, begin.

And so do you begin a

complaint by -- do you begin a claim by filing the
complaint?

Do you begin the claim by having the

summons served?

Is that how it's commenced?

In certain instances where notice is
required of a governmental entity, the way that you
commence by law a matter is by giving notice.

And so

you have to come in and give a notice of a claim.
you don't always commence by filing a complaint.
probate matter you may file a petition.

And
In a

In matters

that come before the Supreme Court that are filed
before administrative bodies, that is -- those are
commenced in -- in different ways, not by complaint or
by summons before the Board of Oil, Gas & Mining, for
example.
And so this statute talks about -- and we
believe that the purpose of the statute is to indicate
that if you commence an action and then it's somehow
dismissed on -- not on the merits, you may -- you may
in this case commence a new action within -- within a
year.
THE COURT:

Well, may I ask this, then?

You -- the -- and this would be jurisdiction, of
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course, because this is a question of -- is it not, of
a statute of limitations 7

If you don't fall within

the statute of limitations, the Court has no
jurisdiction of the matter
But -- I guess my question really is

What

period of time do you think you have, then, one year
from the -- the order of dismissal which would have
been September 4, 2008?
me ask this first

When would the -- well, let

You had a year, you think, to

refile?
MR

PARKER

I guess what -- what the gist

of our argument is that this provision here is -is -- it could have said from the filing of a
complaint

So the legislature clearly should have

said if you're -- if you're dismissed, there's a
dismissal of your complaint, you have to file your
complaint within the year

But it does not

It uses

a much more broad and vague term, and a term that's
used rather loosey-goosey

in the -- in the body of

law, the case law that speaks about the commencing of
an action
And so our point here is, is that the -what the -- this maybe gives a hint as to what the
legislature intended, and that is the legislature
intended that if you file a -- if you initiate an
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action and if that action is terminated for some
reason other than on the merits, for example, it's -it's dismissed without prejudice, that you then have
an additional year.
THE COURT:

That really -But from what date, though?

guess that's my question.
to refile.

I

What -- it's a year period

It's not -- but from what date would

that -MR. PARKER:
dismissal.

It's from the date of

So if I -- if our complaint is dismissed

on January 1, 2009, I have until December 31, 2009, to
refile the complaint.
THE COURT:

And in terms of the statute, the

savings statute, what language or is there other
authority that supports that conclusion that it's a
year from, in this case, September the 4th, 2008?
MR. PARKER:

Well, it -- what —

the

language is within the year after the reversal or
failure.

So this is any action that is "timely filed

and the judgment for the plaintiff is reversed, or the
plaintiff fails in the action or upon a cause of
action otherwise than on the merits."

So we say this

was timely filed, and we have failed -- and you've
caused me to wonder if we really have failed, but
let's assume for a moment that we have -- and we
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failed for a purpose -- failed otherwise than on the
merits, then we may file again within one year after
the reversal or failure

And so that one year would

be within one year from September 4
filed on February 12, 2009

2008

And we

It's clearly within the

one year -- within the one-year period
I maybe even confused myself and possibly
the Court, but -- but if we -- if we take out the one
line, "And the time limited by law or contract for
commencing the action has expired," and you take that
out of the statute -- and I'm looking at page 2 of
the -- of the -- of the State's -- well, I guess of
our supplemental

-- no, it's page 2 of the State's

second brief that cites the statute
Then it says if you file a cause of action
and it's dismissed or it fails for a reason other than
in -- than on the merits, then you can refile within a
year

That's essentially what that says

So it -- it

saves you and gives you some additional time

The

State's claim is, yes, that's the case except if you
file -- if you dismiss it prematurely and so you don't
let the statute run, if you will

Then,

interestingly, you're not saved, you by -- by
dismissing it prematurely you're pulled back into the
original statute and your case fails
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essentially the claim of the State, as I understand
it.
Our argument is that's not what the
legislature intended.

The legislature said, look, if

you file timely and something happens that's not on
the merits -- the judge hasn't said I'm dismissing

it

on the merits, a jury hasn't decided it on the merits,
if it fails for another reason like voluntary
dismissal -- then we're going to give you an extra
year of time.

That's clearly the intent of what the

legi stature i ntended .
The State is trying to say, well, that is
qualified by this one little language that talks about
the commencing of the action.
And our claim is, well, how do you commence
an action against the State?
giving notice.

You commence that by

And so one way we'd respond to the

defense of this is to say you can -- you can defend

--

we can't proceed against State without giving notice.
That's -- how do you initiate a claim against the
State?

You have to give notice.
THE COURT:

you there.

Mr. Parker, I'm going to stop

Your time is expired.

I think I do

understand your position.
MR. PARKER:

Okay.
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THE COURT:
MR. PARKER:
THE COURT:

Thank you.
Thank you.
Mr. Stringham?

MR. STRINGHAM:
commencing an action.

The statute speaks of

An action is a lawsuit.

It's

not a prerequisite to a lawsuit, which is filing a
notice of claim.
THE COURT:

May I ask this?

If

Mr. Parker -- I mean, if that's the interpretation

to

give it -- I give it that interpretation, that is,
commencing means the notice, beginning with the
notice, then what effect does that have in terms of -I'm trying to listen and sort of calculate that
myself, but I don't -- what effect would that have in
terms of the timing here?

If commencing an action in

this context meant filing the notice, giving the
notice that's required

--

MR. STRINGHAM:
THE COURT:

Well, the --

-- what effect would that have?

MR. STRINGHAM:
filed December 11, 2007.

The notice of claim was
So if you say that

commencing an action means filing a notice of claim,
the lawsuit was -- let's see.
dismissed on June 10, 2008.

The lawsuit was
So that was within a year

after the notice of claim was filed; in other words, a
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year within the time that the action was commenced, if
you want to say filing a notice of claim means
commencing an action.
And so the lawsuit in this case would

still

be untimely, if that's what it means, because you
would have one year from the time of filing the notice
of claim.
MR. PARKER:

I think he's right, your Honor.

For all the creative possibility

in our argument in

looking at that, I think the notice of intent -- or
the notice of claim was filed on December 11, 2007.
MR. 5TRINGHAM:
THE COURT:

So the --

Well, I just wanted to see what

effect that would have, and it's -- the argument
remains the same.
MR. 5TRINGHAM:
THE COURT:

Yes.

It was not filed.

It was not --

it was dismissed and not refiled within the one
year -MR. STRINGHAM:

From filing the notice of

claim
THE COURT:

—

MR. STRINGHAM:
THE COURT:

limitation.
-- yes.

Well, what is meant by -- I

guess one thing that I -- sort of troubling just
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conceptually and that is if a matter was dismissed, a
failure -- if a matter failed a day before the year
period, is that -- then that would mean that you were
obligated to refile within that -- that period
MR

STRINGHAM

That's a much harder case

You're right, that is a much harder case
we had five months in this case

But we --

And so we're not --

we don't have those kind of equities tugging at us to
say, well, maybe -- maybe this should be a different
result here
The -- I think you have to give effect to
the plain language of that phrase, "In the time
limited either by law or contract for commencing
action has expired "

You can't ignore that

the

It's in

the statute, and it requires that the -- in order to
get benefit of the statute, the dismissal

without

prejudice has to occur after the statute of
limitations has expired
If you step back from that and look at what
the purpose of that statute would be, it makes a lot
of sense

The legislature is saying

okay

if

somebody's timely filed a lawsuit, they've done what
they're supposed to do but for whatever reason it
fails but it doesn t fail on the merits and the
statute of limitations is expired

then they
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couldn't -- you could make an argument that you can't
refile if it faiIs
But the legislature said, well, in that case
if the statute of limitations has expired and it
hasn't failed on the merits, we're going to give those
people another year

And that's, I think, the

fairness that comes into play with the statute
If -- to accept the plaintiffs' argument, I
think, would be to gut the -- the notice -- or, excuse
me, the one-year statute of limitations provision in
the Immunity Act that says you have to file within a
year after the notice of claim is denied
I would remind the Court of the Hansen case
In that case, the plaintiffs did file a notice of
claim, but the Court still held that the cause of
action that was dismissed without prejudice was
untimely -- or, excuse me, it wasn't covered by the
savings statute because the dismissal had been within
the original two-year limitation period in that case
And then I would also remind the Court of
the Harward case in which a plaintiff with a claim
against a government agency filed the lawsuit one day
beyond the statute of limitations period

And in that

case the trial court and the Supreme Court held that
the lawsuit was barred
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I think I've -- I've taken up enough of the
Court's time on this unless you have any more
questi ons.
THE COURT:

No, I think I understand your

posi ti on.
MR. STRINGHAM:
THE COURT:

Thank you.

MR. STRINGHAM:
THE COURT:

Okay.

Thank you.

I appreciate everyone's argument

and their briefing on the matter.

I think

I'm

prepared to give you a ruling.
This is a statute of limitations.

The

question is whether the Court has jurisdiction.

In

order to reach the result Mr. Parker urges, I would
have to essentially, I believe, ignore the language
that we focused in here on and that is:

"And the time

limited either by law or contract for commencing the
action has expired," either by way of filing a
complaint or even commencing the action.

If

commencing meant just filing the notice, the action
was not filed within that year -- within the year
period .
And I must say, I have to give a reasonable
interpretation, but I think there's support in the
cases that Mr. Stringham has cited that this language
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does have meaning, and it means that if the action
is -- fails within the time period, that you have the
remainder of the time period to refile

If it fails

beyond the time period, and I think this is similar

to

other statute of limitations, it then adds another
year to the statute of limitations, because by
definition if it fails after the time period, then
you're out of time
meaningless

So a failure would be

It would have the same effect as if it

were dismissed on the merits, if you will, and that
is, you couldn't refile if time had expired
So it seems in giving the effect of this
language and also the sort of logic of it

if you

will -- and that is, you must file within the time
period if it fails within the time period

If it

fails outside of the time period, you're given

another

year to file
Consequently, and for all those reasons, the
defendant's motion is granted
Mr
reflects this
MR

Stringham, if you'll draw an order
ruling
STRINGHAM

THE COURT
Mr

Parker 7

MR

PARKER

I will, your Honor
Thank you

Your Honor, I failed to
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introduce Counsel who's sitting here with me, Rachel
Sykes.

Rachel just passed the bar this last year.
MS. SYKES:
MR. PARKER:

Two years ago.
Two years ago, I'm sorry.

She

has a father who you've probably seen in this court
before.

But I failed to introduce her, and I

apologize for that.

I just wanted to correct that

oversi ght.
THE COURT:

The tradition continues.

to have you in the courtroom.
MS, SYKES:
THE COURT:

Thank you, your Honor.
Again, thank you for your

argument and your briefing on the matter.
MR. PARKER:

Thank you, your Honor.

(End of proceed!ngs.)
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